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Abstract 
The goal of the OBO (Open Biomedical Ontologies) Foundry 
initiative is to create and maintain an evolving collection of 
non-overlapping interoperable ontologies that will offer un-
ambiguous representations of the types of entities in biological 
and biomedical reality. These ontologies are designed to serve 
non-redundant annotation of data and scientific text. To 
achieve these ends, the Foundry imposes strict requirements 
upon the ontologies eligible for inclusion. While these re-
quirements are not met by most existing biomedical terminol-
ogies, the latter may nonetheless support the Foundry’s goal 
of consistent and non-redundant annotation if appropriate 
mappings of data annotated with their aid can be achieved. To 
construct such mappings in reliable fashion, however, it is 
necessary to analyze terminological resources from an onto-
logically realistic perspective in such a way as to identify the 
exact import of the ‘concepts’ and associated terms which 
they contain. We propose a framework for such analysis that 
is designed to maximize the degree to which legacy terminolo-
gies and the data coded with their aid can be successfully used 
for information-driven clinical and translational research. 
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Introduction  
Familiarly, biomedical information is published using multiple 
different sorts of terminologies, classifications and coding 
systems. This diversity produces silo effects, which reduce the 
value of annotations created on the basis of such systems by 
making data both difficult to access and resistant to integra-
tion. Ontologies such as the Gene Ontology, in contrast, seek 
to overcome these problems by providing corridors of seman-
tic interoperability between distinct information resources [1]. 
The idea is that, if multiple bodies of relevant information can 
be annotated using common, non-redundant sets of categories 
with definitions formulated in some common logical language, 
then the information they contain will thereby be more easily 
accessible and more readily capable of being integrated to-
gether computationally. This strategy is now increasingly be-
ing applied also in the field of human health. [2] Unfortunate-
ly, many of the ontologies being employed in specific life 
science disciplines and in associated clinical specialisms are 
still built by groups working independently or with no resort 
to common ontological standards.  
Increasingly, one or other version of description logic such as 
OWL 2.0 is being used in their development. However, the 
use of a logical representation language alone is clearly not 
enough to ensure the high quality of an information resource 
[3], and even ontologies employing the same formal language 
are often not combinable into a single resource because of 
incompatibilities between the ways this language is used by 
different groups. [4]  
The goal of the OBO (Open Biomedical Ontologies) Foundry 
is to counter such tendencies by promoting the creation of a 
single, expanding family of ontologies designed to be intero-
perable and logically well-formed and to incorporate accurate 
representations of biological reality. Ontologies are admitted 
into the Foundry, and to its on-going process of review, only if 
their developers commit to an evolving set of common prin-
ciples [2], of which the most important for our purposes are: 
(1) that terms and definitions should be built up composition-
ally out of component representations taken either from 
the same ontology or from more basic feeder ontologies;  
(2) that for each domain there should be convergence upon 
exactly one Foundry ontology; [5] 
(3) that ontologies should use upper-level categories drawn 
from Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) [6] together with re-
lations unambiguously defined according to the pattern 
set forth in the OBO Relation Ontology (RO) [7]. 
The concept orientation 
Concept-based terminologies such as SNOMED CT consist of 
groups of terms, each such group being linked to a ‘concept’ 
that is said to define the meaning of the corresponding terms. 
We have argued that the inconsistent interpretations of the 
word ‘concept’ embraced by the creators and users of such 
terminologies have given rise to multiple distinct modeling 
practices, which in turn have given rise to inconsistent repre-
sentations. [8-9]  
Our identification of these problems – which are now ac-
knowledged also by other experts in the field [10-11] – does 
not, however, imply that we dismiss traditional terminology 
resources as being without value. On the contrary, it is clear 
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that the majority of these systems will continue to play an im-
portant role in the information-driven clinical and translational 
science of the future, and this for at least two reasons.  
First, huge quantities of clinical and research data have al-
ready been annotated (and in some cases compiled ab initio) 
in their terms, and it cannot be expected that these data will be 
annotated a second time using OBO Foundry ontologies 
created de novo.  
Second, where Foundry ontologies seek to represent the enti-
ties on the side of reality, traditional terminology systems are 
designed to reflect the ways language is used by clinicians and 
others in reporting (for example) patient encounters. This 
closeness to the needs of clinicians and healthcare institutions 
suggests that concept-based systems may still be in common 
use in the future.  
The problem must be addressed, however, that the data result-
ing from such annotation efforts, precisely because they stay 
so close to the language used in specific disciplinary commun-
ities, and because they are affected by the multiple modeling 
paradigms associated with the orientation around ‘concepts’, 
are marked by the detrimental effects of silo formation.  
The widespread adoption of SNOMED CT would diminish 
such effects. But as long as SNOMED CT itself does not use a 
consistent ontological approach [12], we believe that the data 
expressed with its aid, too, will involve too high a degree of 
redundancy and of inconsistent coding [13].  
SNOMED’s structure does not as yet provide a consistently 
accessible and reliable representation of the reality on the side 
of the patient as this reality changes through time. Moreover, 
SNOMED in its current form will not be able to do justice in 
consistent fashion to the changes in our knowledge of this 
reality which will be brought by advances in translational 
science [14]. To address these problems we need a strategy to 
map legacy terminologies such as SNOMED CT to OBO 
Foundry ontologies in such a way as to ensure that both can 
contribute to the creation of the non-redundant common 
framework for data integration and exploitation that will be 
needed in the future.  
Objectives 
The underlying idea is that both terminology artifacts and on-
tologies contain representational units (such as single words) 
and combinations thereof (such as compound word phrases 
and whole sentences) – together called ‘representations’ in 
what follows. The goal is to subject such representations to 
careful inspection of a sort which can allow terminological 
representations organized around ‘concepts’ to be mapped to 
appropriate ontological counterparts. To this end, we must 
provide a framework for ontological analysis of terms in lega-
cy terminologies that will support adequate mappings espe-
cially for those terms that, because they are declared as ‘syn-
onyms’, are associated with single ‘concepts’ under the termi-
nological view. Such terms must be mapped separately whe-
rever they refer – on face value – to entities of different types. 
Methods 
Our framework rests on three principal distinctions: (1) be-
tween generic and specific portions of reality (PORs), (2) be-
tween the various purposes that can be served by definitions, 
and (3) between three distinct levels of reality. 
Generic versus specific portions of reality 
The first distinction separates generals from particulars, or in 
other words it separates generic (GPR) from specific portions 
of reality (SPR). While this distinction, like the remaining 
proposals outlined in this section, can be applied to both con-
tinuants (such as cells and organisms) and occurrents (such as 
lives and deaths), we shall concentrate here exclusively on the 
case of continuants. 
Amongst the generic portions of reality are universals (UNV) 
and what we shall call generic configurations (GCO).  
Universals are denoted by general terms such as ‘human be-
ing’, ‘president’, ‘nation’, ‘population’. Universals are instan-
tiated by particulars such as President Obama, the USA, the 
inhabitants of Buffalo. [15]  
Generic configurations are configurations formed by generic 
portions of reality (GPR) that stand in some relation to each 
other that can be represented by some statement. An example 
is the portion of reality represented by the statement ‘cell 
membrane part_of cell’. Here ‘part_of ’ represents the generic 
part_of relation as described in the Relation Ontology. [7] 
Another example is the portion of reality represented by the 
sentence ‘clinicians are human beings’. Here the word ‘are’ 
denotes what we shall call the subgroup relation, which holds 
between clinicians and human beings. 
Amongst the specific portions of reality (SPR) are, analogous-
ly, particulars (PAR) and specific configurations (SCO).  
PARs are entities that exist only once and are confined in 
space and time. Examples are: Mary, Buffalo, and the World 
Health Organization (WHO). Some PARs are what linguists 
would describe as ‘named entities’, but the majority – a liver 
cell in Mary, the fracture in her leg, and so forth – are not. 
Both specific and generic configurations are represented by 
statements. Each SCO involves at least one PAR that stands in 
some relation to something else, for example to another PAR, 
as in the specific configuration represented by the statement 
‘Mary’s left leg part_of Mary’. If Mary’s left leg is amputated, 
then the two PARs involved in this SCO may survive the am-
putation, but the SCO itself will cease to exist.  
Particulars can be divided into atomic particulars (APA) and 
groups (GRP). An atomic particular is a PAR that constitutes 
a unity in the sense that it has a complete, spatially connected 
external boundary. Examples, again, are: Mary and Mary’s 
left leg. ‘Atomic’ is here not to be understood as implying that 
the entity in question is not further decomposable. If Mary’s 
left leg is amputated, then it may still exist, though not any 
more as part of Mary. Nor is it to be understood that anatomic 
particulars cannot themselves contain parts which are atomic 
(for example Mary herself contains parts which are her cells). 
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GRPs are entities denoted by generic terms such as ‘limb of 
vertebrate’, ‘limb of human being’, and even ‘limb of Mary’. 
Although the latter example will likely not be found in a ter-
minology or ontology, terms of the same sort do occur, exam-
ples being ‘citizen of the United States’, ‘Nobel Prize winner’, 
‘veteran of the Second World War’. Terms denoting GRPs are 
typically formed via combination of smaller terms which 
themselves denote universals, particulars, or other GRPs.  
If Mary is a healthy human being, the entity denoted by the 
noun phrase ‘Mary’s limbs’ is an example of a group (GRP). 
Each of healthy Mary’s limbs is at the same time a part of 
Mary and a member of the corresponding GRP. All members 
of a GRP at any given time are such as to exist at that time. 
Among GRPs, we distinguish further between, bona fide 
groups (BGR), fiat groups (FGR) and extensions (EXT) [16]. 
While these distinctions are by no means trivial, their correct 
understanding is important if we are to find coherent ways to 
manage the large families of terms (for example in SNOMED 
CT the family consisting of terms such as ‘absent leg’, ‘ampu-
tated leg’, ‘withered limb’, ‘absent bone in leg’, ‘limb ampu-
tee’, ‘amputation of lower limb’, ‘amputation of limb’), whose 
meanings are otherwise difficult to capture in a coherent way.  
A bona fide group (BGR) is a group whose members are ho-
mogeneous, are causally linked together, and which is maxim-
al in the sense that all causally linked entities of the relevant 
sort are members of the group. Examples are: Mary’s limbs, 
Mary’s cells, Mary’s molecules.  
A fiat group (FGR) is a group that is demarcated by fiat, such 
as: left lungs of people currently in Buffalo, the left lungs of 
all the people now participating in clinical trial #77639.  
At any time at which the BGR constituted by healthy Mary’s 4 
limbs exists, a cognitive being may explicitly recognize the 
simultaneous existence of any combination of two or more of 
her limbs. Some of these combinations, for instance any group 
of 3 of her limbs, are distinct FGRs, since they fall short of 
being maximal. The groups formed by her two arms and by 
her two legs, in contrast, are BGRs. The relation between fiat 
subgroups of the bona fide group that is formed by Mary’s 
limbs is analogous to the relation between some proper part of 
Mary that is demarcated by fiat and Mary as a whole. There is 
a fiat boundary between healthy Mary’s left arm and the rest 
of Mary’s body in the region of her left shoulder. 
To each continuant universal corresponds a group, called its 
extension (EXT), formed by all and only those particulars that 
are instances of that universal at any given time.  
The purposes of definitions 
Our second distinction recognizes three purposes which a de-
finition of a representational unit may serve: 
P1:  to specify the conditions that must be satisfied for a term 
to be an acceptable designator for a given entity in some 
given community. An example would be:  
chronic pain =def. a pain that has been present for more 
than 3 months 
P2:  to specify what is characteristic of particulars that instan-
tiate a certain universal, for instance: 
disorder =def. a part of an organism which serves as the 
bearer of a disposition to pathological processes [17] 
P3: to demarcate groups and classes by specifying characte-
ristics that their members or elements must exhibit. 
P1 definitions are essentially a matter of terminological deci-
sions. The definition given as example excludes the use of the 
term ‘chronic pain’ for pains lasting less than 3 months. This 
does not mean, however, that a pain in a specific patient that 
has already lasted for 90 days becomes a chronic pain one day 
later. It was, in fact, a chronic pain already from the very be-
ginning, even though this fact was unknown to any observer.  
P2 and P3 definitions help in determining whether a given 
particular is to be classified in a given way. P2 does this at the 
level of universals, while P3 does it for GRPs and as further 
explained, classes.   
First-order entities versus representations 
The third distinction concerns the level of reality at which the 
referent of some representation exists. Of importance here is 
the distinction between  
1. first-order entities such as patients, disorders,
families,
2. beliefs in people’s minds (including beliefs putatively
about objects such as unicorns which do not in fact
exist), and
3. representations in some publicly accessible medium,
for instance a term in an ontology.
Applying the framework 
When a terminology has been selected as one that needs to be 
mapped to OBO Foundry ontologies, each of its representa-
tional units should be inspected to identify, in terms of corres-
ponding representations in Foundry ontologies, what sorts of 
PORs it is able to denote. A problem is that terms from con-
cept-based terminologies often denote multiple distinct sorts 
of PORs, for example because of asserted subtype relation-
ships, as in SNOMED CT, whose concept ‘Finger structure’ 
subsumes the concepts ‘entire finger’ (a UNV under a realist 
framework) and ‘all fingers’ (a GRP) (though SNOMED does 
not specify whether the latter means: ‘all fingers in the world’, 
‘all fingers of a given patient’, ‘all fingers on a given hand’). 
To address this problem, we introduce an intermediary layer 
made up of classes (CLA), understood as arbitrary totalities of 
elements which are either (i) defined through some descriptor 
referring to PORs of any of the sorts described thus far (for 
example: ‘the disorders in all the patients treated by Dr. 
McX’), or (ii) totalities whose elements are themselves so 
defined, or (iii) combinations of (i) and (ii).  
Classes under (i) thus carve out PORs in ways which go far 
beyond GRPs as defined in the foregoing. Classes under (ii) 
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and (iii) allow simultaneous reference to entities associated 
together in ways which have no counterpart POR, for example 
when we wish to assert heritability relations between Mary 
and certain of her ancestors who died many years before she 
was born. 
Defined classes 
Where groups have members, classes have elements. A De-
fined Class (DCL) is a class all of whose elements are speci-
fied by some class description. In the simplest case, this will 
be of the form ‘ξ which stands in R to λ’, where ‘ξ ’ names 
some universal, for example ‘person born in Belgium’, which 
defines what we shall call a Specifically Defined Class (SDC), 
or ‘patient who has tuberculosis’, which defines a Generically 
Defined Class (GDC), each of whose elements enjoys the 
same relation (exemplifies) with instances of the single univer-
sal: tuberculosis. In more complex cases the definition will be 
of a logically more complex form, such as ‘ξ has duration 
which stands in R to λ’, for example in the GDC chronic pain, 
where ξ is the universal: pain, R is the relation longer_than 
and λ is the temporal interval: 90 days. Many of the termino-
logical definitions distinguished under P1 above will define 
terms which refer to GDCs in the outlined sense.  
For each GDC and for each SDC there is some universal from 
whose extension all its elements are drawn. An Ad Hoc Class 
(AHC), in contrast, is a CLA formed through combinations of 
GDCs and SDCs which is such that there is no such overarch-
ing universal. An example is, again, the SNOMED CT con-
cept ‘finger structure’, since among the entities that can be 
denoted by this term are both GRPs and APAs 
Among AHCs, too, we can distinguish both Generic (GAC) 
and Specific Ad Hoc Classes (SAC). An example of a SAC is 
the class whose elements are the clinical signs exhibited by 
some specific patient with tuberculosis [17]. An equivalent 
GAC would be the class whose elements are the clinical signs 
exhibited by all tuberculosis patients assigned to the control 
group of a given clinical trial.  
Solving the semantic proximity problem 
In its January 2009 version SNOMED CT associates the con-
cept ‘Fractured nasal bones (disorder)’ with the following 
synonyms: ‘Fractured nasal bones’ (S1), ‘Broken nose’ (S2), 
‘Fractured nose’ (S3), ‘Fracture of nose’ (S4), ‘Fracture of 
nasal complex’ (S5), and ‘Fracture of nasal bones’ (S6). One 
consequence of the multiple interpretations that are given to 
the term ‘concept’ both inside [12] and outside [8] of 
SNOMED CT is that it is difficult to understand precisely how 
this ‘association’ is to be understood. In practice, what it 
means is that SNOMED is here acknowledging the different 
ways language users capture nasal bone fracture-related in-
formation when entering patient data into a record, and pro-
viding an aid to translating the corresponding bodies of data 
into SNOMED form. As realist ontology (and common sense) 
would suggest, however, it can be assumed that when a study 
nurse enters the term ‘fractured nasal bones’ into a patient 
record, then what he means thereby is not a nose of a certain 
(fractured) sort but rather a certain group of bones. If, accor-
dingly, we are to devise a strategy for translating the resultant 
SNOMED data into the OBO Foundry framework, then our 
mapping will need to take account of the mentioned ‘associa-
tions’ in a more careful way than is possible when all the men-
tioned synonyms are treated en bloc. It is for this reason that 
we introduce the machinery of CLAs and GRPs in the above. 
This machinery is designed to make apparent the unarticulated 
complexity of SNOMED’s synonymy relation by allowing 
each synonym to be treated separately in a way which at the 
same time allows formulation of the needed mappings to the 
corresponding OBO Foundry terms.  
Human bones and noses are represented in the FMA Anatomy 
Ontology [18] by means of representational units denoting the 
universals bone and nose respectively. Fractures, in contrast, 
would be included in an ontology of disorders [17]. To realize 
our proposed strategy, now, scholars developing a mapping 
from SNOMED CT to OBO Foundry ontologies would have 
to decide, in collaboration with the SNOMED authors, what 
precisely the synonymous terms (S1–6) mentioned in our list 
above should properly be understood as denoting. In the 
framework here proposed, for example, S2 and S3 would both 
denote a GDC that is a subgroup of the extension of the uni-
versal nose. S1 would denote, according to further context, 
either a GRP which has nasal bones as members or a GDC 
denoted by the plural term ‘bones of the nose’. 
Another advantage of our strategy is that it helps us to under-
stand the structure of the is a hierarchy in SNOMED CT. 44 
concepts in SNOMED CT are described as being is a parents 
of Fractured nasal bones (disorder). Where all of the syn-
onyms referred to above denote first-order entities on the side 
of the patient, this is not the case for all 44 of the parent con-
cepts listed. ‘Disorder by body site (disorder)’, for example, 
reveals itself upon inspection to denote not a disorder at all but 
rather the way the representational units about disorders are 
further organized. 
Another problematic case is ‘Finding by site (finding)’: frac-
tured nasal bones cannot, in our terms, be a (type) of finding, 
since something can only be found – and hence give rise to a 
finding – if it pre-exists, and is thus independent of, the cor-
responding act of observing. On our strategy, in fact, finding 
data would be mapped, not to bones directly, but rather to the 
corresponding datable observations. 
Conclusion 
It has been stated that ‘Terminologies should not be developed 
by reference to a system of preferred terms, rather they should 
be developed in such a way that their individual nodes and 
[the] relations amongst these nodes are modeled on an under-
lying formal ontology, where the linguistic content of these 
nodes will be filled in based on a system of terms and syn-
onyms (from many different languages) that is associated with 
each node based on the intended ontological interpretation of 
that node’. [19] Few, if any, existing biomedical terminologies 
exhibit these characteristics. The framework we propose is 
designed to promote progress in this respect, with the goal, not 
of developing an underlying formal ontology for these termi-
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nologies themselves, but rather of achieving appropriate map-
pings to OBO Foundry ontologies. The approach provides a 
tool for terminologists to detect ambiguities and conflations in 
the conceptual structures they have designed and to determine 
the correct handling of terms proposed as synonyms; it also 
forces developers of realism-based ontologies to be more pre-
cise about what exactly the representational units in their arti-
facts denote. Certainly there is a long way to go. We acknowl-
edge that the proposed approach is not easy to apply because 
of the subtle distinctions it requires, distinctions which are 
perhaps not easy to understand especially for adepts of the 
concept-based approach. We believe, however, that the ap-
proach promises significant benefits, both practical and theo-
retical, in the long run. 
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